TEXAS DECIDES
PARTI

A TXHPF STUDY OF TEXAS VOTER OPINIONS ON BORDER SECURITY, SCHOOL VOUCHERS, AND ABORTION

APRIL 24, 2024


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## ABOUT THE TEXAS HISPANIC POLICY FOUNDATION

The Texas Hispanic Policy Foundation operates as a nonpartisan, nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization, dedicated and committed to analyzing and exploring the political, economic, social, demographic, and familial attitudes and behaviors of Texas Hispanics. The Foundation conducts surveys, polls, research, data collection and analysis concerning the Hispanic population in Texas. You can find more information about the Foundation at www.TxHPF.org.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Texas Hispanic Policy Foundation conducted a representative survey of 1,600 likely Texas voters between April 5 and 10, 2024. The survey population has a margin of error of $+/-2.45 \%$ and is representative of those Texas registered voters who are likely to vote in November of 2024.

Texas Governor Greg Abbott's handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border is:

- Approved of by $54 \%$ of likely voters and disapproved of by $44 \%$.
- Approved of by $65 \%$ of whites, $47 \%$ of Hispanics \& $15 \%$ of Blacks.
- Approved of by $93 \%$ of Republicans, $54 \%$ of Independents \& $7 \%$ of Democrats.
- Approved of by $96 \%$ of Trump voters, $60 \%$ of Kennedy voters $\& 4 \%$ of Biden voters.

President Joe Biden's handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border is:

- Approved of by $24 \%$ of likely voters and disapproved of by $73 \%$.
- Approved of by $51 \%$ of Blacks, $28 \%$ of Hispanics \& $18 \%$ of whites.
- Approved of by $63 \%$ of Democrats, $21 \%$ of Independents \& $2 \%$ of Republicans.
- Approved of by $63 \%$ of Biden voters, $15 \%$ of Kennedy voters \& $2 \%$ of Trump voters.

The Texas policy of spending $\$ 3.5$ billion in state tax dollars annually on border security is:

- Supported by $61 \%$ of likely voters and opposed by $34 \%$.
- Supported by $67 \%$ of whites, $58 \%$ of Hispanics \& $41 \%$ of Blacks.
- Supported by $86 \%$ of Republicans, $64 \%$ of Independents \& $33 \%$ of Democrats.
- Supported by $70 \%$ of Hispanics who live in border counties and South Texas.
- Supported by $48 \%$ of Hispanics who live in the state's major urban counties.

The recent Texas legislation that makes illegal immigration a state crime is:

- Supported by $58 \%$ of likely voters and opposed by $40 \%$.
- Supported by $69 \%$ of whites, $49 \%$ of Hispanics \& $23 \%$ of Blacks.
- Supported by $95 \%$ of Republicans, $56 \%$ of Independents \& $16 \%$ of Democrats.
- Supported by $61 \%$ of Hispanics in English-only homes \& 46\% where Spanish is spoken.
- Supported by $60 \%$ of Hispanics living in rural counties \& $41 \%$ living in urban counties.

The Texas policy of busing asylum seekers to Northern cities is:

- Supported by $52 \%$ of likely voters and opposed by $44 \%$.
- Supported by $62 \%$ of whites, $47 \%$ of Hispanics and $16 \%$ of Blacks.
- Supported by $85 \%$ of Republicans, $50 \%$ of Independents \& $13 \%$ of Democrats.

Legislation that would use tax dollars to provide school vouchers to all Texas parents is:

- Opposed by $57 \%$ of likely voters and supported by $36 \%$.
- Opposed by $68 \%$ of Blacks, $58 \%$ of Hispanics \& $55 \%$ of whites.
- Opposed by $77 \%$ of Democrats, $56 \%$ of Independents $\& 43 \%$ of Republicans.
- Opposed by $60 \%$ of women \& $54 \%$ of men.
- Opposed by a majority of urban (58\%), suburban (58\%) \& rural (57\%) county residents.

Legislation that would increase the pay of public school teachers is:

- Supported by $90 \%$ of likely voters and opposed by $7 \%$.
- Supported by $98 \%$ of Blacks, $92 \%$ of Hispanics \& $88 \%$ of whites.
- Supported by $98 \%$ of Democrats, $89 \%$ of Independents $\& 86 \%$ of Republicans.

Likely voter preferences among four potential policies regulating abortion in Texas are:

- $15 \%$ prefer abortion be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk.
- $29 \%$ prefer abortion be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.
- $29 \%$ prefer abortion be legal through 12 weeks of pregnancy.
- $27 \%$ prefer abortion be legal through 23-24 weeks of pregnancy.

The preference of the median Texas likely voter is for abortion to be legal through 12 weeks of pregnancy, a policy which though is generally rejected in Texas by both Republican legislators (as being too permissive) and by Democratic legislators (as being too restrictive).
$58 \%$ of women prefer abortion be legal through 12 (33\%) or 23-24 (25\%) weeks of pregnancy, compared to $52 \%$ of men ( $25 \%$ \& $27 \%$ ).
$42 \%$ of women prefer abortion be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk (14\%) or also if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest (28\%), compared to $48 \%$ of men ( $15 \%$ \& $33 \%$ ).
$51 \%$ of white likely voters prefer abortion be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk (16\%) or also if the rape was the result of rape or incest ( $35 \%$ ), compared to $40 \%$ of Hispanics ( $13 \% \& 27 \%$ ) and $24 \%$ of Blacks ( $11 \%$ \& 13\%).
$76 \%$ of Black likely voters prefer abortion be legal through 12 (36\%) or 23-24 (40\%) weeks of pregnancy, compared to $60 \%$ of Hispanics ( $34 \%$ \& $26 \%$ ) and $49 \%$ of whites ( $25 \% \& 24 \%$ ).

76\% of Republicans prefer abortion be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk (26\%) or also if the rape was the result of rape or incest (50\%), compared to $10 \%$ of Democrats (3\% \& 7\%).

90\% of Democrats prefer abortion be legal through or 12 weeks (27\%) or 23-24 weeks (53\%), compared to $24 \%$ of Republicans ( $20 \%$ \& 4\%).

66\% of Hispanic Born-Again Christians prefer abortion be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk $(30 \%)$ or also if the rape was the result of rape or incest ( $36 \%$ ), compared to $34 \%$ of Hispanic Catholics ( $8 \%$ \& 26\%) and $12 \%$ of non-religious Hispanics ( $2 \%$ and 10\%).

## TEXAS VOTER OPINIONS ON BORDER SECURITY, SCHOOL VOUCHERS \& ABORTION

The Texas Hispanic Policy Foundation conducted a representative survey of Texas registered voters who are likely to vote in the November 2024 general election. The survey was fielded between April 5 and April 10, 2024 by contacting registered voters via SMS messages through which the respondents were directed to an online survey platform with the option to complete the survey in English or in Spanish. The survey population of 1,600 has a margin of error of +/- $2.45 \%$ and is representative of those Texas registered voters who are likely to vote in November of 2024.

This report examines opinions of likely Texas voters of the handling of the situation at the U.S.Mexico border by Texas Governor Greg Abbott and President Joe Biden (pp. 3-5) and of three specific immigration and border security policies implemented by the Abbott Administration (pp. 5-10). It then analyzes support among likely Texas voters for school voucher legislation and for a pay increase for public school teachers (pp. 11-13). The report goes on to detail the preferences of likely voters for different proposed policies to regulate abortions in Texas (pp. 14-16). Three final sections examine intra-group differences among Texas Hispanic likely voters in regard to Abbott and Biden's handling of the situation at the border (pp. 16-18), Texas border policies (pp. $18-22$ ) and abortion policy (pp. 23-24). A previous report examined the vote intention of Texas likely voters in the 2024 presidential election, the 2024 Texas U.S. Senate election and the 2024 Texas Railroad Commissioner election.

## 1. SURVEY POPULATION DEMOGRAPHICS

White likely voters account for $58 \%$ of this survey population of likely Texas voters, Hispanic likely voters for $25 \%$, Black likely voters for $12 \%$, and others for 5\% (2\% Asian American, 3\% something else). Women represent $53 \%$ of this population, men $45 \%$ and others $2 \%$. Likely voters between the ages of 18 and 44 account for $34 \%$ of this population, those ages 45 to 64 for $38 \%$ and those 65 and older for $28 \%$. The highest level of educational attainment of $45 \%$ of the population is a four-year college degree or a post-graduate degree, of $40 \%$ of the population is a two-year college degree or some college, and of $15 \%$ of the population is a high school degree or less. Republicans account for $37 \%$ of this population, Democrats for $26 \%$ and Independents for $26 \%$, with $11 \%$ either identifying with another party or group or unsure or not wishing to state their partisan identification. Among those likely voters who cast a ballot in the 2020 presidential election, 52\% report having voted for Trump, 46\% for Biden, and 2\% for other candidates.

## 2. VOTER OPINION OF ABBOTT AND BIDEN'S HANDLING OF SITUATION AT THE BORDER

In the survey the respondents were asked if they approved (strongly or somewhat) or disapproved (strongly or somewhat) of Texas Governor Greg Abbott's handling of the situation at the U.S.Mexico border and of President Joe Biden's handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border.

Table 1 underscores that while more than one-half (54\%) of Texas likely voters approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border, slightly less than one-fourth (24\%) approve of Biden's
handling of the situation at the border. In a similar vein, while 73\% of Texas likely voters disapprove of Biden's handling of the situation at the border ( $59 \%$ strongly), substantially fewer (44\%) disapprove of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border (39\% strongly).

Table 1: Approval and Disapproval of the Handling of the Situation at the U.S.-Mexico Border by Governor Greg Abbott and President Joe Biden

| Approval/Disapproval | Abbott's <br> Handling of Situation | Biden's <br> Handling of Situation |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |
| Approve | $54 \%(43)$ | $24 \%(9)$ |
| Disapprove | $44 \%(39)$ | $73 \%(59)$ |
| Unsure | $2 \%$ | $3 \%$ |

Note: Proportion Strongly Approving and Disapproving in parentheses.
Table 2 contains the approval and disapproval for Abbott and Biden's handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border broken down by the respondent's gender, ethnicity/race, age, education, partisan identification and 2024 U.S. President (Republican Donald Trump and Democrat Joe Biden) and 2024 U.S. Senate vote intention (Republican Ted Cruz and Democrat Colin Allred).

Almost twice as many women approve of Abbott's (51\%) than Biden's (26\%) handling of the situation at the border, as do more than twice as many men ( $58 \% \mathrm{vs} .23 \%$ ).

More than three times as many white likely voters approve of Abbott's (65\%) than Biden's (18\%) handling of the situation at the border, just as more than three times as many Black likely voters approve of Biden's (51\%) than Abbott's (15\%) handling of the situation at the border. In between are Hispanic likely voters, $47 \%$ and $28 \%$ of whom approve of Abbott's and Biden's handling of the border situation, respectively.

More than twice as many likely voters ages 45 to 64 and 65 and older approve of Abbott's (57\% and $61 \%$ ) than Biden's ( $27 \%$ and $25 \%$ ) handling of the situation of the order. The same is true for those ages 18 to 44 ( $43 \%$ vs. 19\%), but more noteworthy for these younger voters are the absolute majorities that disapprove of Abbott's (55\%) and Biden's (76\%) handling of the border situation.

Regardless of level of education, likely voters are notably more likely to approve of Abbott's than Biden's handling of the situation at the border, with the gap the largest among those whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school degree or less ( $64 \%$ vs. $19 \%$ ) and the smallest among those whose highest level of educational attainment is a four-year degree or postgraduate degree (49\% vs. 26\%).

More than nine out of ten Republicans (93\%), Trump voters (96\%) and Cruz voters (97\%) approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border, with a respective $80 \%, 83 \%$ and $84 \%$ strongly supporting Abbott's performance vis-à-vis the border. In a similar vein, $97 \%$ of Republicans, $98 \%$ of Trump voters and $97 \%$ of Cruz voters strongly disapprove of Biden's handling of the situation at the border, with a respective $94 \%, 97 \%$ and $96 \%$ strongly disapproving.

Table 2: Approval and Disapproval of the Handling of the Situation at the U.S.-Mexico Border by Governor Greg Abbott and President Joe Biden Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Abbott Approval | Biden Approval | Abbott Disapproval | Biden Disapproval |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 51\% (40) | 26\% (11) | 47\% (42) | 71\% (56) |
|  | Men | 58\% (48) | 23\% (8) | 40\% (35) | 75\% (62) |
| Ethnicity/Race | White | 65\% (52) | 18\% (7) | 33\% (29) | 80\% (68) |
|  | Hispanic | 47\% (38) | 28\% (12) | 51\% (45) | 70\% (54) |
|  | Black | 15\% (11) | 51\% (21) | 84\% (78) | 43\% (23) |
| Age | 18-44 | 43\% (30) | 19\% (8) | 55\% (50) | 76\% (56) |
|  | 45-64 | 57\% (46) | 27\% (10) | 42\% (37) | 70\% (57) |
|  | 65+ | 61\% (53) | 25\% (10) | 37\% (32) | 73\% (63) |
| Education | High School | 64\% (54) | 19\% (9) | 33\% (30) | 77\% (72) |
|  | 2-Yr/Some College | 55\% (46) | 23\% (11) | 43\% (38) | 64\% (61) |
|  | 4-Yr/Post-Grad | 49\% (36) | 26\% (7) | 49\% (43) | 70\% (62) |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 93\% (80) | 2\% (1) | 6\% (4) | 97\% (94) |
|  | Independent | 54\% (38) | 21\% (5) | 44\% (37) | 78\% (60) |
|  | Democrat | 7\% (4) | 63\% (27) | 91\% (85) | 32\% (9) |
| 2024 Pres. Vote | Trump | 96\% (83) | 2\% (1) | 4\% (3) | 98\% (97) |
|  | Biden | 4\% (1) | 63\% (24) | 94\% (86) | 32\% (7) |
| 2024 Sen. Vote | Cruz | 97\% (84) | 2\% (1) | 3\% (2) | 97\% (96) |
|  | Allred | 7\% (3) | 53\% (20) | 92\% (83) | 43\% (15) |

In sharp contrast to the near-unanimous approval of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border among Republicans, Trump voters and Cruz voters, only 63\% of Democrats, 63\% of Biden voters and $53 \%$ of Allred voters approve of Biden's handling of the situation at the border. Fewer than one in ten Democrats (7\%), Biden voters (4\%) and Allred voters (7\%) however approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border.

Three-fifths (60\%) of voters who intend to vote for Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. in the presidential election approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border (34\% strongly) while 38\% disapprove. Conversely, more than four-fifths (84\%) of Kennedy voters disapprove of Biden's handling of the situation at the border ( $64 \%$ strongly) while $15 \%$ approve.

## 3. VOTER OPINION OF STATE OF TEXAS BORDER SECURITY \& IMMIGRATION POLICY

In the survey the respondents were asked whether they supported (strongly or somewhat) or opposed (strongly or somewhat) three State of Texas policies related to border security and immigration.

The first policy evaluated is the state of Texas's decision to spend approximately $\$ 3.5$ billion in Texas tax dollars annually on border security. The second policy evaluated is legislation passed (but currently blocked pending the resolution of a lawsuit) which makes illegal immigration a state crime and empowers Texas law enforcement to arrest immigrants who have crossed the border illegally. The third policy evaluated is Texas's practice of sending asylum seekers by bus to Northern cities.

Table 3 reveals that $61 \%$ of Texas likely voters support the decision by Governor Abbott and the Republican-controlled Texas Legislature to spend $\$ 3.5$ billion dollars annually on border security, with $39 \%$ of likely voters strongly supporting this policy. In contrast, only $34 \%$ of likely voters oppose this policy ( $20 \%$ strongly).

Table 3. Support Among Likely Voters for Three Current Texas Border Security Policies

| Texas Immigration/Border Security Policy | Support | Oppose | Don't Know |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Spending \$3.5bn in Texas Tax Dollars Annually on <br> Border Security | $61 \%(39)$ | $34 \%(20)$ | $5 \%$ |
|  <br> Empowering TX Police to Arrest Illegal Immigrants | $58 \%(48)$ | $40 \%(31)$ | $2 \%$ |
| Busing Immigrants Seeking Asylum to Northern Cities | $52 \%(41)$ | $44 \%(36)$ | $4 \%$ |

Note: Proportion Strongly Supporting and Opposing the policy in parentheses.
Table 3 also reveals that 58\% of Texas likely voters support ( $48 \%$ strongly) legislation passed by the Republican-controlled Texas Legislature and signed into law by Governor Abbott in 2023 which makes illegal immigration a state crime and gives the members of Texas law enforcement the authority to arrest anyone who is in the country illegally. In contrast, $40 \%$ of likely voters oppose this policy, $31 \%$ strongly. Implementation of the policy is currently on hold pending the outcome of litigation in the federal court system.

Finally, Table 3 highlights that a narrower majority (52\%) support ( $41 \%$ strongly) the Abbottimplemented policy of busing asylum seekers to Northern cities governed by Democratic mayors, compared to $44 \%$ who oppose this policy ( $36 \%$ strongly).

Table 4 contains the support for and opposition to the current Texas policy of spending $\$ 3.5$ billion dollars a year on border security broken down by gender, ethnicity/race, age, education, partisan identification and 2024 U.S. President and 2024 U.S. Senate vote intention.

Significantly more men ( $65 \%$ vs. $32 \%$ ) and women ( $58 \%$ vs. $35 \%$ ) support than oppose the spending of $\$ 3.5$ billion a year on border security.

Significantly more white (67\% vs. 28\%) and Hispanic (58\% vs. 38\%) likely voters support than oppose spending $\$ 3.5$ billion a year on border security. Conversely, more Black likely voters oppose (55\%) than support (41\%) this policy.

Absolute majorities of all three age groups support spending $\$ 3.5$ billion a year on border security, although support is significantly higher among those ages 45 to 64 ( $64 \%$ ) and 65 and older (68\%) than among those ages 18 to 44 (52\%).

Table 4. Support For \& Opposition To Spending \$3.5bn in Texas Tax Dollars Annually on Border Security Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Support | Oppose | Unsure |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 58\% (35) | 35\% (20) | 7\% |
|  | Men | 65\% (44) | 32\% (20 | 3\% |
| Ethnicity/Race | White | 67\% (45) | 28\% (17) | 5\% |
|  | Hispanic | 58\% (37) | 38\% (21) | 4\% |
|  | Black | 41\% (18) | 55\% (35) | 4\% |
| Age | 18-44 | 52\% (31) | 43\% (27) | 5\% |
|  | 45-64 | 64\% (42) | 30\% (17) | 6\% |
|  | 65+ | 68\% (45) | 27\% (16) | 5\% |
| Education | High School | 67\% (48) | 25\% (16) | 8\% |
|  | 2-Yr/Some College | 64\% (42) | 32\% (20) | 4\% |
|  | 4-Yr/Post-Grad | 57\% (34) | 37\% (22) | 6\% |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 86\% (66) | 11\% (6) | 3\% |
|  | Independent | 64\% (37) | 31\% (20) | 5\% |
|  | Democrat | 33\% (11) | 59\% (35) | 8\% |
| 2024 Pres. Vote | Trump | 89\% (70) | 8\% (4) | 3\% |
|  | Biden | 31\% (8) | 60\% (38) | 9\% |
| 2024 Senate Vote | Cruz | 90\% (71) | 7\% (3) | 3\% |
|  | Allred | 31\% (10) | 62\% (39) | 7\% |

Absolute majorities of all educational groups support spending $\$ 3.5$ billion a year on border security, ranging from a high of $67 \%$ among those whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school degree or less to a low of $57 \%$ among those whose highest level of educational attainment is a four-year college degree or post-graduate degree.

Nine out of ten Republicans (86\%), Trump voters (89\%) and Cruz voters (90\%) support the current Texas policy of spending $\$ 3.5$ billion a year on border security, as do one-third of Democrats (33\%), Biden voters (31\%) and Allred voters (31\%).

Six out of ten Democrats (59\%), Biden voters (60\%), and Allred voters (62\%) oppose the current Texas policy of spending $\$ 3.5$ billion on border security, as do one out of ten Republicans (11\%), Trump voters (8\%) and Cruz voters (7\%).

Table 5 contains the support for and opposition to the 2023 Texas law that made illegal immigration a state crime and empowers Texas law enforcement to arrest illegal immigrants broken down by gender, ethnicity/race, age, education, partisan identification and 2024 U.S. President and 2024 U.S. Senate vote intention.

Table 5. Support For \& Opposition To Making Illegal Immigration a State Crime \& Empowering Texas Law Enforcement to Arrest Illegal Immigrants Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Support | Oppose | Unsure |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 56\% (45) | 42\% (32) | 2\% |
|  | Men | 62\% (54) | 36\% (28) | 2\% |
| Ethnicity/Race | White | 69\% (60) | 29\% (23) | 2\% |
|  | Hispanic | 49\% (35) | 49\% (38) | 2\% |
|  | Black | 23\% (16) | 75\% (56) | 2\% |
| Age | 18-44 | 49\% (36) | 49\% (39) | 2\% |
|  | 45-64 | 60\% (51) | 38\% (29) | 2\% |
|  | 65+ | 66\% (58) | 31\% (23) | 3\% |
| Education | High School | 72\% (63) | 27\% (19) | 1\% |
|  | 2-Yr/Some College | 61\% (50) | 37\% (28) | 2\% |
|  | 4-Yr/Post-Grad | 52\% (42) | 46\% (36) | 2\% |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 95\% (86) | 4\% (2) | 1\% |
|  | Independent | 56\% (44) | 42\% (30) | 2\% |
|  | Democrat | 16\% (7) | 81\% (66) | 3\% |
| 2024 Pres. Vote | Trump | 97\% (89) | 2\% (1) | 1\% |
|  | Biden | 11\% (4) | 85\% (70) | 3\% |
| 2024 Senate Vote | Cruz | 97\% (89) | 2\% (1) | 1\% |
|  | Allred | 17\% (7) | 81\% (65) | 2\% |

Absolute majorities of both men (62\%) and women (56\%) support the Texas policy that makes illegal immigration a state crime, with $54 \%$ and $45 \%$ strongly supporting the policy, respectively.

Significantly more white likely voters (69\%) support than oppose (29\%) the Texas policy that makes illegal immigration a crime, while significantly more Black likely voters oppose (75\%) than support (23\%) this policy. Hispanic likely voters are equally split between those who support (49\%) and oppose (49\%) the policy.

While significantly more likely voters who are between the ages of 45 and 64 ( $60 \%$ vs. $38 \%$ ) and who are 65 and older ( $66 \%$ vs. $31 \%$ ) support than oppose making illegal immigration a state crime in Texas, likely voters between the ages of 18 and 44 are evenly split between those who support (49\%) and oppose (49\%) this policy.

While significantly more likely voters whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school degree or less ( $72 \%$ vs. $27 \%$ ) or a two-year degree or some college ( $61 \%$ vs. $37 \%$ ) support than oppose making illegal immigration a state crime in Texas, likely voters whose highest level of educational attainment is a four-year degree or post-graduate degree are relatively evenly split between those who support (52\%) and oppose (46\%) this policy.

Virtually all Republicans (95\%), Trump voters (97\%) and Cruz voters (97\%) support the Texas policy of making illegal immigration a state crime, with $86 \%, 89 \%$ and $89 \%$ strongly supporting this policy, respectively. Support for the policy is much lower among Democrats (16\%), Biden voters (11\%) and Allred voters (17\%).

Table 6 contains the support for and opposition to the Texas policy of busing asylum seekers to northern cities broken down by gender, ethnicity/race, age, education, partisan identification and 2024 U.S. President and 2024 U.S. Senate vote intention.

While men are significantly more likely to support (55\%) than oppose (41\%) the busing of asylum seekers to northern cities, women are relatively evenly divided between those who support (50\%) and oppose (46\%) this policy.

White likely voters are significantly more likely to support (62\%) than oppose (35\%) the busing of asylum seekers to northern cities, Black likely voters are significantly more likely to oppose (77\% than support (16\%) the policy, and Hispanics are relatively evenly split between those who oppose (50\%) and support (47\%) the policy.

While significantly more voters who are between the ages of 45 and 64 ( $53 \%$ vs. $43 \%$ ) and 65 and older ( $59 \%$ vs. $37 \%$ ) support than oppose the busing of asylum seekers to Northern cities, likely voters between the ages of 18 and 44 are notably more likely to oppose (52\%) than support (43\%) the policy.

While significantly more likely voters whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school degree or less ( $60 \%$ vs. 40\%) or a two-year degree or some college ( $54 \% \mathrm{vs} .42 \%$ ) support than oppose busing asylum seekers to Northern cities, likely voters whose highest level of educational attainment is a four-year degree or post-graduate degree are relatively evenly split between those who oppose (49\%) and support (47\%) this policy.

Table 6. Support For \& Opposition To Busing Immigrants Seeking Asylum to Northern Cities
Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Support | Oppose | Unsure |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 50\% (37) | 46\% (36) | 4\% |
|  | Men | 55\% (47) | 41\% (35) | 4\% |
| Ethnicity/Race | White | 62\% (51) | 35\% (28) | 4\% |
|  | Hispanic | 47\% (33) | 50\% (40) | 3\% |
|  | Black | 16\% (9) | 77\% (64) | 7\% |
| Age | 18-44 | 43\% (31) | 52\% (43) | 5\% |
|  | 45-64 | 53\% (43) | 43\% (36) | 4\% |
|  | 65+ | 59\% (49) | 37\% (29) | 4\% |
| Education | High School | 60\% (49) | 34\% (27) | 6\% |
|  | 2-Yr/Some College | 54\% (43) | 42\% (34) | 4\% |
|  | 4-Yr/Post-Grad | 47\% (36) | 49\% (41) | 4\% |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 85\% (73) | 12\% (10) | 3\% |
|  | Independent | 50\% (39) | 47\% (38) | 3\% |
|  | Democrat | 13\% (3) | 82\% (67) | 5\% |
| 2024 Pres. Vote | Trump | 86\% (76) | 11\% (9) | 3\% |
|  | Biden | 10\% (2) | 86\% (74) | 4\% |
| 2024 Senate Vote | Cruz | 87\% (77) | 10\% (8) | 3\% |
|  | Allred | 13\% (3) | 84\% (70) | 3\% |

Almost nine out of ten Republicans (85\%), Trump voters (86\%) and Cruz voters (87\%) support the policy of busing asylum seekers to Northern cities, as do one out of ten Democrats (12\%), Biden voters ( $10 \%$ ) and Allred voters (13\%). More than eight out of ten Democrats ( $82 \%$ ), Biden voters ( $86 \%$ ) and Allred voters ( $84 \%$ ) oppose the busing of asylum seekers to Northern cities, as do one out of ten Republicans (12\%), Trump voters (11\%) and Cruz voters (10\%).

## 4. VOTER OPINION OF SCHOOL VOUCHER AND TEACHER PAY INCREASE PROPOSALS

In the survey the respondents were asked to look ahead to the 2025 regular session of the Texas Legislature and then queried about whether they would support or oppose legislation that would provide vouchers funded by public tax dollars to all parents to help send their children to private schools. They also were asked if they would support legislation in 2025 that would increase the pay of public school teachers.

Table 7 reveals that $36 \%$ of 2024 likely voters in Texas support school voucher legislation (21\% strongly) while $57 \%$ oppose it ( $47 \%$ strongly). The table also underscores that virtually all likely voters (90\%) support legislation that would increase the pay of public school teachers (71\% strongly), compared to only 7\% who oppose this legislation (3\% strongly).

Table 7. Support For \& Opposition To Proposals for the Provision of School Vouchers to All Parents and for a Public School Teacher Pay Increase

| Legislative Proposal | Support | Oppose | Don't Know |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Provide Vouchers for All Parents to Help Send <br> Children to Private Schools | $36 \% ~(21)$ | $57 \%(47 \%)$ | $7 \%$ |
| Increase the Pay of Public School Teachers | $90 \%(71)$ | $7 \%(3)$ | $3 \%$ |

Note: Proportion Strongly Supporting and Opposing the proposal in parentheses.
Table 8 contains the support for and opposition to school voucher legislation broken down by respondent gender, ethnicity/race, age, education, religion, region of residence, partisan identification and 2024 U.S. President and 2024 U.S. Senate vote intention.

There exist little in the way of significant ethnic/racial, education and regional differences in regard to support for and opposition to school voucher legislation, with absolute majorities of all three ethnic/racial groups, all three educational groups and all four regional groups opposing school voucher legislation. There do, however, exist significant gender, age, religion and partisan/vote intention related differences.

First, men (40\%) are significantly more likely to support school voucher legislation than are women (32\%), although an absolute majority of both genders ( $54 \%$ and $60 \%$ ) oppose school voucher legislation, $43 \%$ and $50 \%$ strongly.

Second, likely voters age 65 and older are significantly more likely than voters ages 18 to 44 to support ( $42 \%$ vs. $28 \%$ ) and significantly less likely to oppose school voucher legislation ( $51 \%$ vs. $64 \%)$. Absolute majorities of all three age cohorts do however oppose school voucher legislation.

Third, likely voters who identify as Born-Again Christians are significantly more likely than both Christians who are not Born-Again and non-Religious likely voters to support school voucher legislation ( $45 \%$ vs. $30 \%$ and $24 \%$ ) and significantly less likely to oppose school voucher legislation ( $47 \%$ vs. $62 \%$ and $68 \%$ ).

Table 8. Support For \& Opposition To a Legislative Proposal to Provide School Vouchers to All Parents Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups.

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Support | Oppose | Unsure |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 32\% (18) | 60\% (50) | 8\% |
|  | Men | 40\% (24) | 54\% (43) | 6\% |
| Ethnicity/Race | White | 37\% (22) | 55\% (44) | 8\% |
|  | Hispanic | 34\% (19) | 58\% (46) | 8\% |
|  | Black | 27\% (15) | 68\% (61) | 5\% |
| Age | 18-44 | 28\% (14) | 64\% (52) | 8\% |
|  | 45-64 | 36\% (22) | 56\% (47) | 8\% |
|  | 65+ | 42\% (26) | 51\% (41) | 7\% |
| Education | High School | 39\% (22) | 53\% (41) | 8\% |
|  | 2-Yr/Some College | 39\% (22) | 53\% (42) | 8\% |
|  | 4-Yr/Post-Grad | 32\% (19) | 62\% (53) | 6\% |
| Religion | Born-Again Christian | 45\% (28) | 47\% (32) | 8\% |
|  | Other Christian | 30\% (17) | 62\% (50) | 8\% |
|  | Not Religious | 24\% (16) | 68\% (57) | 8\% |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 50\% (32) | 43\% (32) | 7\% |
|  | Independent | 37\% (23) | 56\% (44) | 7\% |
|  | Democrat | 17\% (7) | 77\% (68) | 6\% |
| Region | Urban | 34\% (18) | 58\% (49) | 8\% |
|  | Suburban | 35\% (22) | 58\% (47) | 7\% |
|  | Regional Hubs | 36\% (22) | 61\% (47) | 3\% |
|  | Rural | 34\% (20) | 57\% (47) | 9\% |
| 2024 Pres. Vote | Trump | 54\% (35) | 37\% (28) | 9\% |
|  | Biden | 12\% (5) | 82\% (73) | 6\% |
| 2024 Senate Vote | Cruz | 56\% (36) | 36\% (26) | 8\% |
|  | Allred | 15\% (6) | 81\% (72) | 4\% |

Fourth, Republicans (50\%), Trump voters (54\%) and Cruz voters (56\%) are significantly more likely to support school voucher legislation than are Democrats (17\%), Biden voters (12\%) and Allred voters (15\%). Conversely, Democrats (77\%), Biden voters (82\%) and Allred voters (81\%) are significantly more likely to oppose school voucher legislation than are Republicans (43\%), Trump voters (37\%) and Cruz voters (36\%). Significantly more Independent likely voters oppose (56\%) than support (37\%) school voucher legislation.

Table 9 contains the support for and opposition to legislation that would increase public teacher pay broken down by gender, ethnicity/race, age, education, religion, region of residence, partisan identification and 2024 U.S. President and 2024 U.S. Senate vote intention.

Texans are essentially unanimous as well as relatively similar in their support for this legislation, with levels of support across the socio-demographic sub-groups that ranges from $82 \%$ to $98 \%$.

Table 9. Support For \& Opposition To a Legislative Proposal to Increase the Pay of Public School Teachers Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups.

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Support | Oppose | Unsure |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 90\% (74) | 7\% (3) | 3\% |
|  | Men | 90\% (67) | 8\% (4) | 2\% |
| Ethnicity/Race | White | 88\% (67) | 9\% (4) | 3\% |
|  | Hispanic | 92\% (75) | 5\% (3) | 3\% |
|  | Black | 98\% (84) | 1\% (1) | 1\% |
| Age | 18-44 | 93\% (77) | 5\% (2) | 2\% |
|  | 45-64 | 90\% (72) | 8\% (4) | 2\% |
|  | 65+ | 87\% (62) | 10\% (4) | 3\% |
| Education | High School | 91\% (67) | 7\% (5) | 2\% |
|  | 2-Yr/Some College | 89\% (68) | 8\% (4) | 3\% |
|  | 4-Yr/Post-Grad | 91\% (75) | 6\% (3) | 3\% |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 86\% (59) | 11\% (6) | 3\% |
|  | Independent | 89\% (68) | 8\% (4) | 3\% |
|  | Democrat | 98\% (90) | 1\% (0) | 1\% |
| Religion | Born-Again Christian | 87\% (65) | 10\% (5) | 3\% |
|  | Other Christian | 91\% (73) | 6\% (3) | 3\% |
|  | Not Religious | 95\% (77) | 3\% (2) | 2\% |
| Location | Urban | 92\% (74) | 6\% (3) | 2\% |
|  | Suburban | 88\% (67) | 9\% (4) | 3\% |
|  | Regional Hubs | 94\% (73) | 5\% (3) | 1\% |
|  | Rural | 87\% (69) | 9\% (3) | 4\% |
| 2024 Pres. Vote | Trump | 82\% (53) | 14\% (7) | 4\% |
|  | Biden | 98\% (90) | 1\% (0) | 1\% |
| 2024 Senate Vote | Cruz | 82\% (52) | 14\% (7) | 4\% |
|  | Allred | 98\% (90) | 1\% (0) | 1\% |

## 5. VOTER PREFERENCE FOR FOUR POTENTIAL TEXAS ABORTION POLICIES

The survey respondents were asked which of four policies regulating abortion comes closest to their preferred policy for the regulation of abortion in Texas.

- Abortion should be illegal in Texas, except if the woman's life is at risk.
- Abortion should be illegal in Texas, except if the woman's life is at risk or in the case of rape or incest.
- Abortion should be legal in Texas for any reason through 12 weeks of pregnancy.
- Abortion should be legal in Texas for any reason through 23-34 weeks of pregnancy.

The first option is the policy currently in force in Texas while the last option is the policy that had been enshrined by Roe v. Wade prior to the 2023 Dobbs decision.

Table 10 reveals that $15 \%$ of Texans prefer the state's current abortion policy while $27 \%$ prefer the national standard that had existed under Roe v. Wade. Equal proportions (29\%) prefer a policy under which abortion would be illegal except if the woman's life was at risk or in the case of rape or incest, and, (29\%) prefer a policy under which abortion would be legal for any reason through 12 weeks of pregnancy. Among these four alternatives, the preference of the median Texas likely voter is for abortion to be legal through 12 weeks of pregnancy, a policy which though is generally rejected by both Republican legislators (as being too permissive) and by Democratic legislators (as being too restrictive) in Texas.

Table 10: Preferred Texas Abortion Policy Among Four Common Policy Alternatives

| Proposed Abortion Policy | Proportion Listing as Preferred Policy (\%) |
| :--- | :---: |
|  |  |
| Illegal, unless woman's life at risk | $15 \%$ |
| Illegal, unless woman's life at risk or rape/incest | $29 \%$ |
| Legal for any reason through 12 weeks | $29 \%$ |
| Legal for any reason through 23-24 weeks | $27 \%$ |

Table 11 contains the distribution of abortion policy preferences broken down by respondent gender, ethnicity/race, age, education, partisan identification, religion and 2024 U.S. President and 2024 U.S. Senate vote intention.

There do not exist any noteworthy gender differences in regard to the abortion policy preferences.

The median white likely voter's preferred abortion policy is (narrowly) for abortion to be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk or the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. In contrast, the median Hispanic and Black likely voter's preferred abortion policy is for abortion to be legal through 12 weeks of pregnancy, with $40 \%$ of Black likely voters (compared to $26 \%$ of Hispanic and $24 \%$ of white likely voters) preferring a policy under which abortion would be legal through 23 to 24 weeks of pregnancy.

The preferred abortion policy of the median likely voter age 65 and older is that abortion be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. In contrast, the preferred policy of the median 45 to 64 year old and of the median 18 to 44 year old is that abortion be legal through 12 weeks of pregnancy, with $41 \%$ of the $18-44$ cohort preferring a policy under which abortion is legal through 23-24 weeks of pregnancy, compared to $22 \%$ of those ages 45 to 64 and $18 \%$ of those 65 and older.

Table 11: Distribution of Preferred Texas Abortion Policy Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups
$\left.\begin{array}{|l|l|c|c|c|c|}\hline \text { Demographic } & \text { Sub-Group } & \begin{array}{c}\text { Illegal, } \\ \text { Exception } \\ \text { for } \\ \text { Woman's } \\ \text { Life }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Illegal, } \\ \text { Exception } \\ \text { for } \\ \text { Woman's } \\ \text { Life } \\ \text { R Rape- } \\ \text { Incest }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Legal } \\ \text { Through } \\ \text { 12 } \\ \text { Weeks of } \\ \text { Pregnancy }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Legal } \\ \text { 2hrough 23- }\end{array} \\ \text { Pregnancy }\end{array}\right]$

The preferred abortion policy of the median voter whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school degree or less is abortion being illegal unless the woman's life is at risk or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. In contrast, the preferred policy of those likely voters with a four-year or post-graduate degree is abortion being legal through 12 weeks of pregnancy.

The preferred abortion policy of the median Born-Again Christian likely voter is that abortion be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest, while that of other Christians is that abortion be legal through 12 weeks of pregnancy and that of likely voters who are not-religious is that abortion be legal through 23-24 weeks of pregnancy.

The preferred abortion policy of the median Republican likely voter is that abortion be illegal unless the woman's life is at risk or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest, while that of Independents is that abortion be legal through 12 weeks of pregnancy and that of Democrats is that abortion be legal through 23-24 weeks of pregnancy.

One in four (26\%) Republicans prefers an abortion policy where abortion is illegal unless the woman's life is at risk and $50 \%$ prefer a policy under which abortion is illegal unless the woman's life is at risk or if the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. These are preferences shared by only 3\% and 7\% of Democrats respectively.

More than half (53\%) of Democrats prefer an abortion policy under which abortion is legal for any reason through 23-24 weeks of pregnancy and $37 \%$ prefer a policy under which abortion is legal through 12 weeks pregnancy. These are preferences shared by only $4 \%$ and $20 \%$ of Republicans respectively.

## 6. HISPANIC VOTER OPINION OF ABBOTT \& BIDEN'S HANDLING OF SITUATION AT THE BORDER

The overall sample population of 1,600 contains within it a representative population of 404 Hispanic likely voters (margin of error of $+/-4.88 \%$ ). This section explores the opinions of different Hispanic sub-groups based on gender, age, education, partisan identification, religion, immigration generation, region of residence, Hispanic lineage, and language use in the home.

Table 12 provides the distribution of Hispanic approval and disapproval of Texas Governor Greg Abbott and President Joe Biden's respective handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border broken down by gender, age, education, religion, partisanship, immigration generation, region of residence, Hispanic lineage, and language use at home.

There do not exist any significant gender, education, generation, or Hispanic lineage differences in approval of Abbott's handing of the situation at the border, nor do there exist any significant gender, age, education, generation, region or Hispanic lineage differences in approval of Biden's handling of the situation at the border.

Hispanic Born-Again Christians (71\%) are significantly more likely to approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border than are Hispanics who are Catholic (41\%) and not religious (27\%).

Hispanics who are not religious (35\%) are significantly more likely than Hispanics who are BornAgain Christians (19\%) to approve of Biden's handling of the situation at the border.

Table 12. Hispanic Approval and Disapproval of Abbott and Biden's Handling of the Situation at the U.S.-Mexico Border Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Abbott Approval | Biden Approval | Abbott <br> Disapproval | Biden Disapproval |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 45\% (41) | 27\% (9) | 53\% (46) | 70\% (53) |
|  | Men | 49\% (35) | 30\% (14) | 49\% (44) | 69\% (54) |
| Age | 18-44 | 43\% (34) | 23\% (11) | 55\% (28) | 76\% (57) |
|  | 45-64 | 54\% (45) | 30\% (12) | 45\% (40) | 68\% (55) |
|  | 65+ | 45\% (38) | 39\% (14) | 52\% (43) | 57\% (43) |
| Education | 4 Yr. College Degree | 48\% (38) | 29\% (11) | 51\% (42) | 71\% (50) |
|  | No 4 Yr. College Degree | 47\% (39) | 28\% (12) | 51\% (43) | 69\% (56) |
| Religion | Born-Again Christian | 71\% (55) | 19\% (3) | 28\% (22) | 80\% (72) |
|  | Roman Catholic | 41\% (35) | 33\% (14) | 56\% (51) | 64\% (50) |
|  | Not Religious | 27\% (21) | 35\% (20) | 72\% (66) | 65\% (40) |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 92\% (82) | 0\% (0) | 7\% (5) | 99\% (95) |
|  | Independent | 51\% (41) | 25\% (6) | 47\% (41) | 75\% (58) |
|  | Democrat | 11\% (5) | 54\% (28) | 89\% (82) | 33\% (12) |
| Generation | Immigrant | 53\% (46) | 18\% (14) | 44\% (41) | 79\% (53) |
|  | First Generation | 41\% (35) | 26\% (8) | 58\% (48) | 74\% (52) |
|  | Second Generation | 54\% (41) | 29\% (12) | 46\% (41) | 71\% (60) |
|  | Third Generation+ | 52\% (35) | 33\% (11) | 46\% (48) | 64\% (50) |
| Region | Major Urban | 39\% (31) | 25\% (12) | 57\% (50) | 72\% (48) |
|  | Suburban | 57\% (50) | 27\% (13) | 43\% (40) | 71\% (64) |
|  | Rural | 55\% (43) | 28\% (23) | 45\% 38) | 70\% (56) |
|  | RGV/Border/S. Texas | 51\% (41) | 35\% (15) | 48\% (42) | 64\% (54) |
| Grandparents | 4 Hispanic | 46\% (38) | 30\% (12) | 52\% (43) | 67\% (52) |
|  | Less than 4 Hispanic | 49\% (39) | 27\% (11) | 50\% (44) | 72\% (56) |
| Language-Home | Only English Spoken | 62\% (40) | 23\% (8) | 46\% (33) | 74\% (61) |
|  | Spanish Spoken | 47\% (39) | 30\% (12) | 69\% (52) | 52\% (48) |

[^0]Hispanics who are Republicans are significantly more likely to approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border ( $92 \%$ vs. $11 \%$ ) and significantly less likely to approve of Biden's handling of the situation at the border ( $0 \%$ vs. $54 \%$ ) than are Hispanic Democrats.

Hispanics who live in the major urban counties (39\%) of the state (Bexar, Dallas, Harris, Tarrant, Travis) are significantly less likely to approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border than are Hispanics who live in rural counties (55\%) and in suburban counties (57\%).

Hispanics who live in households where only English is spoken are significantly more likely to approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border ( $62 \% \mathrm{vs} .47 \%$ ) and significantly less likely to approve of Biden's handling of the situation at the border ( $46 \% \mathrm{vs} .69 \%$ ) than are Hispanics who live in households where Spanish is spoken.

## 7. HISPANIC VOTER OPINION OF TEXAS GOVERNMENT BORDER \& IMMIGRATION POLICY

Table 13 provides the distribution of Hispanic support and opposition for the current Texas policy of spending $\$ 3.5$ billion in Texas tax dollars annually on border security broken down by gender, age, education, religion, partisanship, immigration generation, region of residence, Hispanic lineage, and language use at home.

There do not exist any noteworthy intra-group differences in support for this policy based on gender, education, immigration generation, Hispanic lineage or home language use.

While an absolute majority (52\%) of Hispanics 18 to 44 in age support this policy, this proportion is significantly less than the proportions of Hispanics 65 and older ( $65 \%$ ) who support Texas spending $\$ 3.5$ billion a year on border security.

While significantly more Hispanic Born-Again Christians (73\% vs. $23 \%$ ) and Hispanic Catholics ( $56 \%$ vs. $38 \%$ ) support the Texas policy of spending $\$ 3.5$ billion a year on border security, Hispanics who are not religious are more likely to oppose (50\%) than to support (44\%) this policy, albeit not significantly so.

Almost nine out of ten Hispanic Republicans (86\%) support spending $\$ 3.5$ billion annually on border security, as do almost one-third of Hispanic Democrats (32\%). In contrast, one in ten Hispanic Republicans (11\%) and six in ten Hispanic Democrats (60\%) oppose this policy.

Texas Hispanics who live in the border region and South Texas are significantly more likely to support (70\%) than oppose (25\%) Texas spending $\$ 3.5$ billion on border security, and are also significantly more likely to support this policy than are Hispanics who live in the major urban counties (48\%).

Table 13. Hispanic Support For \& Opposition To Spending \$3.5bn in Texas Tax Dollars Annually on Border Security Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Support | Oppose | Unsure |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 57\% (34) | 36\% (210 | 7\% |
|  | Men | 64\% (43) | 32\% (20) | 4\% |
| Age | 18-44 | 52\% (31) | 43\% (27) | 5\% |
|  | 45-64 | 63\% (40) | 31\% (18) | 6\% |
|  | 65+ | 65\% (42) | 30\% (19) | 5\% |
| Education | 4 Yr. College Degree | 64\% (43) | 31\% (19) | 5\% |
|  | No 4 Yr. College Degree | 56\% (32) | 38\% (22) | 6\% |
| Religion | Born-Again Christian | 73\% (49) | 23\% (13) | 4\% |
|  | Roman Catholic | 56\% (33) | 38\% (24) | 6\% |
|  | Not Religious | 44\% (25) | 50\% (33) | 6\% |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 86\% (65) | 11\% (6) | 3\% |
|  | Independent | 63\% (36) | 32\% (20) | 5\% |
|  | Democrat | 32\% (10) | 60\% (37) | 8\% |
| Generation | Immigrant | 53\% (38) | 39\% (13) | 8\% |
|  | First Generation | 47\% (32) | 52\% (33) | 1\% |
|  | Second Generation | 67\% (41) | 31\% (21) | 2\% |
|  | Third Generation+ | 58\% (33) | 35\% (15) | 7\% |
| Region | Major Urban | 48\% (31) | 45\% (21) | 7\% |
|  | Suburban | 59\% (36) | 41\% (28) | 0\% |
|  | Rural | 63\% (39) | 35\% (19) | 2\% |
|  | RGV/Border/S. Texas | 70\% (44) | 25\% (15) | 5\% |
| Grandparents | 4 Hispanic | 60\% (39) | 32\% (11) | 8\% |
|  | Less than 4 Hispanic | 58\% (36) | 39\% (23) | 3\% |
| Language-Home | Only English Spoken | 63\% (48) | 33\% (11) | 4\% |
|  | Spanish Spoken | 57\% (33) | 39\% (23) | 4\% |

Note: Proportion Strongly Supporting and Opposing the proposal in parentheses.

Table 14 provides the distribution of Hispanic support and opposition for the Texas policy of making illegal immigration a state crime and empowering law enforcement to arrest illegal immigrants broken down by gender, age, education, religion, partisanship, immigration generation, region of residence, Hispanic lineage, and language use at home.

There do not exist any noteworthy intra-group differences in support for this policy based on gender, education, generation, or Hispanic lineage

Significantly more Hispanics ages 18 to 44 oppose (55\%) than support (42\%) the Texas legislation which makes illegal immigration a state crime.

Table 14. Hispanic Support For \& Opposition To Making Illegal Immigration a State Crime \& Empowering Texas Police to Arrest Illegal Immigrants Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Support | Oppose | Unsure |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 49\% (33) | 50\% (38) | 1\% |
|  | Men | 48\% (37) | 49\% (38) | 3\% |
| Age | 18-44 | 42\% (30) | 55\% (46) | 3\% |
|  | 45-64 | 55\% (41) | 45\% (32) | 0\% |
|  | 65+ | 54\% (36) | 43\% (31) | 3\% |
| Education | 4 Yr. College Degree | 46\% (32) | 53\% (42) | 1\% |
|  | No 4 Yr. College Degree | 51\% (37) | 47\% (35) | 2\% |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 89\% (75) | 10\% (7) | 1\% |
|  | Independent | 48\% (35) | 50\% (36) | 2\% |
|  | Democrat | 21\% (7) | 77\% (60) | 2\% |
| Religion | Born-Again Christian | 72\% (51) | 26\% (19) | 2\% |
|  | Roman Catholic | 46\% (30) | 51\% (36) | 3\% |
|  | Not Religious | 27\% (21) | 73\% (61) | 0\% |
| Generation | Immigrant | 45\% (25) | 55\% (40) | 0\% |
|  | First Generation | 43\% (36) | 57\% (50) | 0\% |
|  | Second Generation | 55\% (38) | 44\% (34) | 1\% |
|  | Third Generation+ | 49\% (38) | 48\% (33) | 3\% |
| Region | Major Urban | 41\% (29) | 56\% (41) | 3\% |
|  | Suburban | 39\% (40) | 59\% (45) | 2\% |
|  | Rural | 60\% (44) | 40\% (36) | 0\% |
|  | RGV/Border/S. Texas | 48\% (38) | 49\% (37) | 3\% |
| Grandparents | 4 Hispanic | 52\% (40) | 44\% (29) | 4\% |
|  | Less than 4 Hispanic | 48\% (34) | 51\% (40) | 1\% |
| Language-Home | Only English Spoken | 61\% (48) | 36\% (25) | 3\% |
|  | Spanish Spoken | 46\% (32) | 53\% (42) | 1\% |

Note: Proportion Strongly Supporting and Opposing the proposal in parentheses.
Nine out of ten Hispanic Republicans support (89\%) this legislation compared to 10\% who oppose it. In contrast, eight out of Hispanic Democrats oppose (77\%) this legislation compared to $21 \%$ who support it.

Nearly three-quarters (72\%) of Hispanic Born-Again Christians support this policy (51\% strongly) compared to $26 \%$ who oppose it. Conversely, $73 \%$ of non-religious Hispanics oppose this policy
( $61 \%$ strongly) compared to $27 \%$ who support. Hispanics who are Catholic are relatively equally divided between those who oppose (51\%) and support (46\%) the making of illegal immigration a state crime in Texas.

Three-fifths (60\%) of Hispanics who live in rural areas of the state support the legislation which made illegal immigration a state crime, a proportion that is significantly greater than the proportion of Hispanic supporters of the policy who live in the major urban (41\%) and suburban (39\%) areas of the state.

Hispanics who live in households where only English is spoken (61\%) are significantly more likely to support this legislation making illegal immigration a state crime than are Hispanics who live in households where Spanish is spoken (46\%).

Table 15 provides the distribution of Hispanic support and opposition to the Texas policy of busing asylum seekers to Northern cities broken down by gender, age, education, religion, partisanship, immigration generation, region of residence, Hispanic lineage, and language use at home.

There do not exist any noteworthy intra-group differences in support for this policy based on gender, age, education, immigration generation, Hispanic lineage, or household language use.

Eight out of ten (80\%) Hispanic Republicans support this policy, compared to $18 \%$ who oppose it. Conversely, eight out of ten (77\%) Hispanic Democrats oppose this legislation, compared to 18\% who support it.

A significant majority of Hispanic Born-Again Christians support the policy of busing asylum seekers to Northern cities ( $57 \%$ vs. $38 \%$ ), while a significant majority of non-religious Hispanics oppose this policy ( $61 \%$ vs. $34 \%$ ). Catholic Hispanics are relatively evenly split between those who oppose (51\%) and support (46\%) this policy.

Hispanics who live in rural counties are significantly more likely than Hispanics elsewhere in the state to support this policy, with $59 \%$ in support compared to between $44 \%$ and $45 \%$ in the other regions of the state.

Table 15. Hispanic Support For \& Opposition To Busing Immigrants Seeking Asylum to Northern Cities Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Support | Oppose | Unsure |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 47\% | 50\% | 3\% |
|  | Men | 46\% | 49\% | 5\% |
| Age | 18-44 | 46\% (31) | 50\% (42) | 4\% |
|  | 45-64 | 48\% (36) | 48\% (40) | 4\% |
|  | 65+ | 47\% (35) | 51\% (35) | 2\% |
| Education | 4 Yr. College Degree | 48\% (33) | 49\% (43) | 3\% |
|  | No 4 Yr. College Degree | 47\% (32) | 50\% (39) | 3\% |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 80\% (69) | 18\% (14) | 2\% |
|  | Independent | 46\% (36) | 52\% (46) | 2\% |
|  | Democrat | 18\% (3) | 77\% (60) | 5\% |
| Religion | Born-Again Christian | 57\% (45) | 38\% (44) | 5\% |
|  | Roman Catholic | 46\% (32) | 51\% (41) | 3\% |
|  | Not Religious | 34\% (19) | 61\% (52) | 5\% |
| Generation | Immigrant | 54\% (38) | 40\% (31) | 6\% |
|  | First Generation | 49\% (38) | 48\% (43) | 3\% |
|  | Second Generation | 50\% (36) | 48\% (38) | 2\% |
|  | Third Generation+ | 39\% (27) | 58\% (45) | 3\% |
| Region | Major Urban | 45\% (30) | 49\% (37) | 6\% |
|  | Suburban | 45\% (36) | 49\% (44) | 6\% |
|  | Rural | 59\% (39) | 41\% (37) | 0\% |
|  | RGV/Border/S. Texas | 44\% (33) | 55\% (44) | 1\% |
| Grandparents | 4 Hispanic | 42\% (31) | 55\% (44) | 3\% |
|  | Less than 4 Hispanic | 49\% (35) | 48\% (39) | 3\% |
| Language-Home | Only English Spoken | 49\% (37) | 48\% (39) | 3\% |
|  | Spanish Spoken | 46\% (33) | 51\% (40) | 3\% |

Note: Proportion Strongly Supporting and Opposing the proposal in parentheses.

## 8. HISPANIC VOTER TEXAS ABORTION POLICY PREFERENCES

Table 16 provides the distribution of Hispanic voter preferences for four potential policies regulating abortion in Texas broken down by gender, age, education, religion, partisanship, immigration generation, region of residence, Hispanic lineage, and language use at home.

Table 16. Distribution of Hispanic Voter Preferences for Four Potential Texas Abortion Policies Among Key Socio-Demographic Groups

| Demographic | Sub-Group | Illegal, Exception for Woman's Life | Illegal, Exception for Woman's Life \& RapeIncest | Legal Through 12 <br> Weeks of Pregnancy | Legal <br> Through 23-24 <br> Weeks of <br> Pregnancy |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Gender | Women | 10\% | 27\% | 37\% | 26\% |
|  | Men | 15\% | 28\% | 31\% | 26\% |
| Age | 18-44 | 11\% | 20\% | 35\% | 34\% |
|  | 45-64 | 13\% | 33\% | 33\% | 21\% |
|  | 65+ | 16\% | 35\% | 34\% | 15\% |
| Education | 4 Yr. College Degree | 8\% | 25\% | 34\% | 33\% |
|  | No 4 Yr. Degree | 16\% | 28\% | 34\% | 22\% |
| Religion | Born-Again Christian | 30\% | 36\% | 25\% | 9\% |
|  | Roman Catholic | 8\% | 26\% | 43\% | 23\% |
|  | Not Religious | 2\% | 10\% | 30\% | 58\% |
| Partisan ID | Republican | 27\% | 47\% | 22\% | 4\% |
|  | Independent | 5\% | 31\% | 38\% | 26\% |
|  | Democrat | 3\% | 10\% | 48\% | 39\% |
| Generation | Immigrant | 22\% | 29\% | 32\% | 17\% |
|  | First Generation | 6\% | 29\% | 41\% | 24\% |
|  | Second Generation | 15\% | 25\% | 34\% | 26\% |
|  | Third Generation+ | 10\% | 26\% | 34\% | 30\% |
| Region | Major Urban | 14\% | 19\% | 33\% | 34\% |
|  | Suburban | 14\% | 24\% | 38\% | 24\% |
|  | Rural | 13\% | 38\% | 32\% | 17\% |
|  | RGV/Border/S. Texas | 10\% | 37\% | 34\% | 19\% |
| Grandparents | 4 Hispanic | 10\% | 32\% | 33\% | 25\% |
|  | Less than 4 Hispanic | 14\% | 25\% | 35\% | 26\% |
| Language-Home | Only English Spoken | 17\% | 20\% | 31\% | 32\% |
|  | Spanish Spoken | 12\% | 28\% | 36\% | 24\% |

By and large there do not exist a great deal of noteworthy intra-group differences in regard to preferences, with three principal exceptions related to age, religion and partisanship.

First, Hispanics between the ages of 18 and 44 (34\%) are significantly more likely to prefer a policy under which abortion is legal through 23-24 weeks of pregnancy than are Hispanics who are 65 and older (15\%). Similarly, while $51 \%$ of Hispanics age 65 and older prefer a policy under which abortion is either legal only if the woman's life is at risk (16\%) or in the event that the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest ( $35 \%$ ), the same is true for only $31 \%$ of those ages 18 to 44 ( $11 \%$ \& 20\%).

Second, two-thirds (66\%) of Hispanic Born-Again Christians prefer a policy under which abortion is either legal only if the woman's life is at risk (30\%) or in the event that the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest (36\%), compared to only $34 \%$ of Catholic Hispanics ( $8 \%$ \& 26\%) and $12 \%$ of non-religious Hispanics ( $2 \% \& 10 \%$ ). By the same token, $58 \%$ of non-religious Hispanics and 23\% of Catholic Hispanics would prefer that abortion be legal in Texas through 23-24 weeks of pregnancy, compared to only 9\% of Born-Again Christian Hispanics.

Third, $74 \%$ of Republican Hispanics prefer a policy under which abortion is either legal only if the woman's life is at risk (27\%) or also in the event that the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest ( $47 \%$ ), compared to $13 \%$ of Democratic Hispanics ( $3 \%$ \& 10\%). Conversely, 39\% of Hispanic Democrats would prefer that abortion be legal in Texas through 23-24 weeks of pregnancy, compared to only 4\% of Hispanic Republicans.


[^0]:    Note: Proportion Strongly Supporting and Opposing the proposal in parentheses.

