BORDER SECURITY, IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND ABBOTT & BIDEN'S HANDLING OF THE SITUATION AT THE BORDER A STUDY OF TEXAS VOTERS AND TEXAS HISPANIC VOTERS

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ABOUT THE TEXAS HISPANIC POLICY FOUNDATION

The Texas Hispanic Policy Foundation operates as a nonpartisan, nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization, dedicated and committed to analyzing and exploring the political, economic, social, demographic, and familial attitudes, and behaviors of Texas Hispanics. In collaboration with Rice University and the Baker Institute for Public Policy, the Foundation conducts surveys, polls, research, data collection and analysis concerning the Hispanic population in Texas. You can find more information about the Foundation at www.TxHPF.org.

Executive Summary

This report draws on an October 2021 survey of 1,402 Texas registered voters, including 616 Texas Hispanics. It reveals the opinions and attitudes of Texans in general, and of Texas Hispanics in particular, regarding five border security policies implemented by the State of Texas, three potential federal immigration policies related to Central American and Mexican immigrants and to refugees and asylum seekers, and the handling of the U.S.-Mexico border situation by President Joe Biden and by Texas Governor Greg Abbott.

More Texans support all five Abbott border security policies than oppose them. More Texas Hispanics support four of these five policies than oppose them.

62% of Texans support and 21% oppose the Texas policy of having Department of Public Safety (DPS) and local law enforcement arrest immigrants who cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally. The remainder (17%) neither support nor oppose the policy.

51% of Texas Hispanics support and 25% oppose the Texas policy of having DPS and local law enforcement arrest immigrants who cross the border illegally.

58% of Texans support and 27% oppose the Texas policy of sending Texas National Guard soldiers to patrol along the border.

46% of Texas Hispanics support and 32% oppose the Texas policy of sending Texas National Guard soldiers to patrol along the border.

57% of Texans support and 26% oppose the Texas policy of sending DPS officers to patrol along the border.

48% of Texas Hispanics support and 30% oppose the Texas policy of sending DPS officers to patrol along the border.

52% of Texans support and 31% oppose the Texas policy of spending \$1.5 billion annually in state funds on border security.

41% of Texas Hispanics support and 35% oppose the Texas policy of spending \$1.5 billion annually in state funds on border security.

53% of Texans support and 36% oppose the Texas policy of building a wall along the border.

45% of Texas Hispanics oppose and 38% support the Texas policy of building a wall along the border.

Hispanics in South Texas are significantly more likely to support these five Abbott border security policies than are Hispanics elsewhere in the state.

30% of Texans support and 51% oppose increasing the number of refugees and asylum seekers allowed into the United States.

35% of Texas Hispanics support and 42% oppose increasing the number of refugees and asylum seekers allowed into the United States.

29% of Texans support and 50% oppose increasing the number of immigrants from Mexico and Central America allowed into the United States.

37% of Texas Hispanics support and 39% oppose increasing the number of immigrants from Mexico and Central America allowed into the United States.

Hispanics whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school degree or less are significantly more likely to oppose increasing the number of Mexican and Central American immigrants than are Hispanics with higher levels of educational attainment.

56% of Texans believe the U.S. Federal Government should make it more difficult for Central American immigrants to request and obtain asylum in the United States while 44% believe the U.S. Federal Government should make it less difficult.

56% of Texas Hispanics believe the U.S. Federal Government should make it less difficult for Central American immigrants to request and obtain asylum in the United States while 44% believe the U.S. Federal Government should make it more difficult.

31% of Texans approve of the way that President Joe Biden is handling the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border while 61% disapprove.

35% of Texas Hispanics approve of the way that President Joe Biden is handling the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border while 55% disapprove.

49% of Texans approve of the way that Governor Greg Abbott is handling the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border while 42% disapprove.

42% of Texas Hispanics approve of the way that Governor Greg Abbott is handling the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border while 48% disapprove.

Hispanics with two or fewer Hispanic grandparents are significantly more likely to disapprove (68%) and significantly less likely to approve (23%) of Biden's handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border than Hispanics with three or more Hispanic grandparents (50% and 39%).

BORDER SECURITY, IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND ABBOTT & BIDEN'S HANDLING OF THE SITUATION AT THE BORDER: A STUDY OF TEXAS VOTERS AND TEXAS HISPANIC VOTERS

This is the third report of four drawing on a survey of 1,402 Texas registered voters carried out between October 14 and October 27 of 2021 (confidence interval of +/-2.6%). The survey included an oversample of 402 Hispanic registered voters for a total number of 616 Hispanics overall(confidence interval of +/- 4.0%) to allow for a more fine-grained analysis of this important demographic. The responses are weighted to provide a population that is representative of Texas registered voters (for more information on the methodology, see the appendix). In this report we carry out an analysis of the attitudes and opinions of Texans in general and of Texas Hispanics in particular related to a set of border security policies adopted by the state of Texas, proposed immigration reforms, and the current handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border by Texas Governor Greg Abbott and President Joe Biden.

1. Survey Population

The distribution of those surveyed based on their ethnic/racial self-identification is 52% white/Anglo, 33% Hispanic/Latino, 12% Black/African American and 3% other. The gender distribution of the population is 53% women and 47% men. In regard to generations, 38% of the population belongs to the combined Silent Generation (born between 1928 and 1945) and Baby Boomers (1946-1964) cohort, 26% to Generation X (1965-1980), 28% to the Millennial (1981-1996) generation and 8% to Generation Z (1997-2003). The distribution of the population based on educational attainment is: high school degree or less (30%), some college or a two-year degree (31%), and a four-year or postgraduate degree (39%).

Finally, 36% of the population identifies as Democrat, 33% as Republican and 24% as Independent, with 2% unsure and 5% who identify with another political party or political group. If independents who lean Democratic and independents who lean Republican are coded as Democrats and Republicans respectively, instead of as independents, then the proportion of Republicans rises to 43% and the proportion of Democrats rises to 42%. The distribution of the 2020 presidential vote of the respondents who participated in that election is 53% for Donald Trump and 46% for Joe Biden, compared to the actual Texas 2020 vote results of 52.1% for Trump and 46.5% for Biden.

The Hispanic survey population (616 total) has the following socio-demographic distributions. The gender distribution of the population is 55% women and 45% men. In regard to generations, 27% of the population belongs to the combined Silent Generation (born between 1928 and 1945) and Baby Boomers (1946-1964) cohort, 25% to Generation X (1965-1980), 35% to the Millennial (1981-1996) generation and 13% to Generation Z (1997-2003) (in the analysis the Millennial and

Generation Z categories are combined). The distribution of the population based on educational attainment is: high school degree or less (43%), some college or a two-year degree (32%), and a four-year or postgraduate degree (25%).

Two-fifths (43%) of the Hispanics surveyed identify as Democrat, 25% as Republican and 26% as Independent, with 4% unsure and 2% who identify with another political party or political group. If independents who lean Democratic and independents who lean Republican are coded as Democrats and Republicans respectively, instead of as independents, then the proportion of Democrats rises to 50% and the proportion of Republicans rises to 31%. And, among those Hispanics who voted in the 2020 presidential election, 58% reported voting for Joe Biden and 41% for Donald Trump, with 1% supporting other candidates. This latter result is consistent with the 2020 national exit poll data that have Biden receiving 58% of the Texas Hispanic vote, Trump 41% and others 1%.

One in five of the Hispanics surveyed is an evangelical Protestant (20%), nearly onehalf are Catholic (47%), 27% profess no religious identity and 6% identify with some other religion. One in ten Hispanics surveyed (10%) live in a Spanish dominant household, 29% live in a household where both English and Spanish are spoken relatively equally, and 51% live in an English dominant household where either more English is spoken than Spanish (34%), or where only English is spoken (27%). Slightly more than one in ten (12%) of the Hispanic registered voters surveyed are immigrants, 17% are first generation Americans, 24% are second generation and 47% are third generation or beyond. More than two-fifths of the Hispanics surveyed have four Hispanic grandparents (61%) while another 5% have three Hispanic grandparents, for a total of 66%. The remaining 34% of Hispanic respondents have two or fewer Hispanic grandparents. One in five of the Hispanic respondents lives in the San Antonio metro area (20%), 19% live in South Texas, 18% live in the Houston metro area, 15% live in the Dallas-Fort Worth metro area, and the remainder live in other areas of state which all contain individually less than 10% of the Hispanic respondent population.

2. Support For & Opposition To Five State of Texas Border Security Policies

The survey asked Texans about how much they support or oppose five border security policies that the State of Texas has implemented under the direction of Republican Governor Greg Abbott. The response options were strongly support, somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, and strongly oppose. The five border security policies evaluated are:

- 1. Texas building a wall on the state's border with Mexico.
- 2. Texas state and local law enforcement arresting people who cross the Mexican border illegally.

3. Texas deploying National Guard soldiers to patrol along the border with Mexico.

4. Texas sending Department of Public Safety (DPS) officers to patrol along the border with Mexico.

5. Texas spending \$1.5 billion dollars every year on border security.

Figure 1 displays the level of support for and opposition to each one of the five border security policies adopted by the State of Texas. A majority of Texans (registered voters age 18 and older) support all five policies, with levels of support ranging from a high of 62% (Texas state and local law enforcement arresting people who cross the border illegally) to a low of 52% (Texas spending \$1.5 billion every year on border security). Levels of opposition range from a low of 21% (Texas state and local law enforcement arresting people who cross the border illegally) to a high of 36% (Texas building a border wall). The proportion of Texans who neither support nor oppose the five policies ranges from 11% to 17%.






Figure 2 examines the support for and opposition to these five policies among the state's three principal ethnic/racial groups. The two support options (strongly and somewhat) and the two oppose options (strongly and somewhat) are respectively combined into single support and oppose categories.



A large majority of white Texans supports all five policies, with 71% in support of Texas law enforcement arresting those who cross the border illegal, 68% in support of Texas deploying the national guard to the border, 66% in support of Texas building a border wall, 65% in support of sending DPS to patrol the border, and 62% in favor of spending \$1.5bn of state funds annually on border security. A plurality of Hispanics supports four of the five policies by margins that range from that for Texas law enforcement arresting those who cross the border illegally (51% in support vs. 25% in opposition) to that for Texas spending \$1.5bn on border security (41% vs. 35%). The one policy opposed by a plurality of Texas Hispanics is the state of Texas building a border wall, a policy opposed by 45% of Texas Hispanics and supported by 38%. A plurality of Black Texans supports three policies (sending the national guard and DPS to patrol the border and arresting illegal border crossers) and opposes two (spending \$1.5bn annually on border security and building a border wall).

Figure 3 examines the support for and opposition to these five policies among Democrats, Independents and Republicans. The two support options (strongly and somewhat) and the two oppose options (strongly and somewhat) are respectively combined into single support and oppose categories.



At least eight in ten Texas Republicans supports each one of these five policies, while fewer than one in ten opposes all of the policies. In sharp contrast, with one exception, law enforcement arresting illegal border crossers, which receives slightly more support (38%) than opposition (37%) among Texas Democrats, a plurality of Texas Democrats oppose all five policies, with opposition most fervent in regard to Texas building a border wall (opposed by 64% and supported by 22%) and Texas spending \$1.5bn annually on border security (opposed by 52% and supported by 28%). A plurality of Independents supports all five reforms at levels of support that range from 61% (arresting illegal border crossers) to 49% (spending \$1.5bn on border security).

Table 1 examines support for and opposition to these five Texas border security policies among the Hispanic demographic sub-groups of gender, generation (chronological) educational achievement, and partisan identification.

Demo	Sub-Group	TX Law	ТХ	ТХ	ТХ	ТХ
		Enforcement	Deploy	Send	Build	Spend
		Arrest	National	DPS to	Border	\$1.5bn
		Illegal	Guard	Border	Wall	on
		Border	to			Border
		Crossers	Border			Security
Gender						
	Women	48/28	44/35	47/30	33/49	38/38
	Men	54/20	49/30	50/29	43/41	45/35
Generation						
	Boomer/Silent	63/21	60/28	59/27	52/40	56/31
	Gen X	51/22	49/27	43/26	34/43	39/36
	Millennial/Gen Z	43/28	37/37	45/33	31/50	34/40
Education						
Euucation	High School	48/33	50/23	52/21	42/38	42/33
	Some College-2Yr	49/27	40/37	45/32	30/51	37/36
	4Yr-Postgrad	48/33	48/40	46/40	38/51	46/45
Partisan ID						
	Democrat	32/36	29/44	34/40	15/67	27/50
	Independent	58/22	50/27	50/30	45/37	40/39
	Republican	79/6	73/14	76/8	71/15	69/10

 Table 1. Support For & Opposition To 5 State of Texas Border Security Policies

 Among Texas Hispanic Demographic Sub-Groups (% Support/% Oppose)

Hispanic men are across the board more likely than Hispanic women to support the five policies, at levels that range from very insignificant (sending DPS and the national guard to the border) to significant (building a border wall).

Among the generations, the one common and substantive difference that exists across all five policies is the notably greater level of support for the border security policy among Baby Boomers/Silent Generation members compared to Millennials and Generation Z. The gap in support between these two generational cohorts ranges from 23% (60% vs. 37%) for deploying the Texas National Guard to the border to a low of 14% (59% vs. 45%) for sending DPS to the border.

There exist no salient or noteworthy differences in Hispanic support for these five policies based on the respondent's level of educational attainment, with one exception. The exception is the building of the border wall by Texas, which is opposed by 51% of Texas Hispanics whose highest level of educational attainment is some college or more, but is opposed by only 38% of those Hispanics whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school degree or less.

Table 2 examines support for and opposition to these five Texas border security policies among the Hispanic demographic sub-groups of religion, immigration generation, ancestry, household language use, and region of residence.

Demo	Sub-Group	TX Law Enforcement Arrest Illegal Border Crossers	TX Deploy National Guard to Border	TX Send DPS to Border	TX Build Border Wall	TX Spend \$1.5bn on Border Security
Religion		0035015	Doruci			Security
	Evangelical-Prot.	51/23	50/28	45/34	40/46	39/39
	Catholic	55/22	52/30	56/22	42/41	51/33
	Non-Religious	43/28	37/36	39/35	32/48	28/39
Generation						
	Immigrant	51/31	50/33	60/25	41/42	48/34
	1st Gen.	49/20	42/33	45/24	33/44	35/37
	2nd Gen.	49/28	46/32	49/36	39/49	35/35
	3rd Gen. +	55/21	50/31	48/28	40/43	40/38
Ancestry						
	1-2 Hisp. Grand.	53/27	46/31	50/28	45/38	41/35
	3-4 Hisp. Grand	50/24	46/32	48/30	35/48	41/37
Language						
00	Spanish Dom.	50/27	54/43	57/24	33/47	39/36
	Equal En. & Sp.	47/22	48/26	48/24	34/43	47/30
	English Dom.	52/26	44/34	47/33	40/46	39/40
Region						
	DFW Metro	56/25	52/27	47/34	43/46	41/46
	HOU Metro	44/23	38/24	45/24	32/44	40/31
	SA Metro	45/34	41/37	41/37	30/54	36/51
	South Texas	59/15	57/25	62/21	44/43	56/24

Table 2. Support For & Opposition To 5 State of Texas Border Security Policies
Among Texas Hispanic Demographic Sub-Groups (% Support/% Oppose)

There are no consistent patterns in regard to intra-Hispanic sub-group differences related to support for and opposition to the five State of Texas border security policies, with two partial exceptions.

First, on average Hispanics who are immigrants tend to be notably more supportive of two border security policies (sending DPS to the border and spending \$1.5bn on border security) than are Hispanics who are the U.S. born children of immigrants (i.e., first generation).

Second, Hispanics residing in South Texas (and to a lesser and more varied extent, in the DFW Metroplex) are on average notably more supportive of these policies than are Hispanics residing in the Houston and San Antonio metro areas. South Texas Hispanics are significantly more supportive of spending \$1.5bn annually on border security and sending the DPS and Texas National Guard to the border than Hispanics elsewhere in the state, but especially compared to those Hispanics living in Houston and San Antonio.

3. Support For & Opposition To Two Potential Immigration Policies

The survey asked Texans about how much they support or oppose two potential federal immigration policies. The response options were strongly support, somewhat support, neither support nor oppose, somewhat oppose, and strongly oppose. The two potential immigration policies evaluated are:

1. Increasing the number of refugees and asylum seekers allowed into the United States.

2. Increasing the number of immigrants from Mexico and Central America allowed into the United States.

Figure 4 displays the distribution of support for and opposition to these two potential federal policies related to immigration. Slightly less than one-third of Texas registered voters (30% and 29%) support policies that would increase the number of refugees and asylum seekers allowed into the United States and that would increase the number of Mexican and Central American immigrants allowed into the United States, with half (15% and 14% respectively) strongly supporting the policy and with half (15% and 15%) somewhat supporting the policy. In contrast, one-half (51% and 50%) oppose these two immigration policies, with more than two-thirds (37% and 36%) strongly opposing the policies and less than one-third (14% and 14%) somewhat opposing the policies. One fifth (19% and 21%) of Texans neither support nor oppose the policies.




Figure 5 provides the support for and opposition to these two policies broken down by ethnicity/race. White Texans oppose both policies by margins of more than two to one, 59% to 26% in regard to refugees and asylum seekers and 59% to 25% in regard to Mexican and Central American immigrants. Hispanic opinion for the two policies is relatively evenly split between support and opposition, with though more opposing than supporting the respective policies, 42% vs. 35% in regard to refugees and asylum seekers and 39% vs. 27% in regard to Mexican and Central American immigrants. A narrow majority of Black Texans (36% vs. 30%) supports an increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers, with a similar proportion (34%) neither in support nor in opposition to this policy. And, a somewhat more substantial majority of Black Texans (39% vs. 28%) opposes an increase in the number of Mexican and Central American immigrants, with a similar proportion (33%) neither in support nor in opposition to this policy.




Figure 6 provides the support for and opposition to these two policies broken down by partisan ID. Republicans overwhelming oppose both policies, with 77% in opposition to each of the two policies compared to a mere 11% (refugees and asylum seekers) and 13% (Mexican and Central American immigrants) in support. Twice as many Independents oppose than support the two respective policies, 54% to 26% in the case of increasing the number of refugees and asylum seekers and 51% to 24% in the case of increasing the number of Mexican and Central American immigrants. One-half of Democrats support increasing the number of refugees and asylum seekers allowed into the United States (51%) and increasing the number of immigrants from Mexico and Central America allowed into the United States (49%), while one quarter (25% and 25%) of Democrats oppose both policies.




Table 3 examines support for and opposition to these two reforms among the Hispanic demographic sub-groups of gender, generation (chronological) educational achievement, and partisan identification.

Demo	Sub-Group	Increase Number of Refugees & Asylum Seekers (% Support/% Oppose)	Increase Number of Immigrants from Mexico & Central America (% Support/% Oppose)
Demo	Sub-Group		
Gender			
	Women	36/42	38/39
	Men	33/44	37/39
Generation			
	Boomer/Silent	26/60	22/63
	Gen X	25/47	27/40
	Millennial/Gen Z	44/30	51/26
Education			
	High School	25/48	30/44
	Some College-2Yr	35/40	39/36
	4Yr-Postgrad	50/35	48/36
Partisan ID			
	Democrat	45/28	48/24
	Independent	33/46	34/40
	Republican	17/64	24/64

Table 3. Support For & Opposition To Two Immigration Reforms Among Texas Hispanic Demographic Sub-Groups (% Support/% Oppose)

There exist no salient gender differences in regard to support for these two reforms. Hispanics belonging to the Baby Boomer/Silent Generation cohort and Generation X are however significantly more likely to oppose and significantly less likely to support these two reforms than are Hispanics belonging to the Millennial/Generation Z cohort.

In a similar manner, Hispanics whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school degree or less are significantly less likely to support these two reforms than are Hispanics with a four-year college degree or higher.

And, Hispanic Democrats are significantly more likely to support and significantly less likely to oppose these reforms than either Hispanic Independents or, especially, Hispanic Republicans. Table 4 examines support for and opposition to these two reforms among the Hispanic demographic sub-group of religion, immigration generation, ancestry, household language use, and region of residence.

Demo	Sub-Group	Increase Number of Refugees & Asylum Seekers (% Support/% Oppose)	Increase Number of Immigrants from Mexico & Central America (% Support/% Oppose)
Religion			
	Evangelical-Prot.	27/52	28/49
	Catholic	35/45	37/42
	Non-Religious	40/32	44/27
Generation			
	Immigrant	39/39	37/43
	1st Gen.	38/36	41/30
	2nd Gen.	36/39	39/39
	3rd Gen. +	30/51	32/46
Ancestry			
	1-2 Hisp. Grand.	35/42	36/38
	3-4 Hisp. Grand	35/43	38/37
Language			
	Spanish Dom.	40/41	38/33
	Equal En. & Sp.	34/35	41/29
	English Dom.	34/46	35/43
Region			
•	DFW Metro	33/45	34/38
	HOU Metro	48/36	44/30
	SA Metro	40/45	43/43
	South Texas	30/45	32/43

Table 4. Support For & Opposition To Two Immigration Reforms Among Texas Hispanic Demographic Sub-Groups (% Support/% Oppose)

Evangelical Protestant Hispanics are significantly more likely to oppose and significantly less likely to support these two reforms than are non-religious Hispanics.

There exist no salient differences in regard to support for or opposition to these policies among Hispanics based on the number of generations their family has been in the United States, with two noteworthy exceptions. Hispanics who are third generation or beyond are significantly more likely to oppose increasing the number of refugees and asylum seekers allowed into the United States than are Hispanics from the other three immigration generational groups, and third generation (and beyond) Hispanics are significantly more likely to oppose increasing the number of Mexican and Central American immigrants allowed into the United States than are first generation Hispanics.

There do not exist any notable differences among Hispanics in support for these two reforms based on the number of Hispanic grandparents they have nor on the use of English in their household, with the modest exception that Hispanics who live in households where English is the dominant language are significantly more likely to oppose allowing more Mexican and Central American immigrants into the United States than are Hispanics who live in households where English and Spanish are spoken equally.

Finally, Hispanics residing in South Texas are significantly less likely to support increasing the number of Mexican and Central American immigrants allowed into the United States than are Hispanics residing in the Houston and San Antonio metro areas.

Hispanics residing in the Dallas-Fort Worth (DFW) metro area are also significantly less likely than Hispanics residing in metro Houston to support increasing the number of refugees and asylum seekers allowed into the United States.


4. The Future Direction of Asylum Policies for Central American Immigrants

A large proportion of immigrants who have requested asylum in the United States in recent years have come from Central America, in particular the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. In the survey, the respondents were asked which of the following two statements came closest to matching their position on what U.S. policy should be regarding Central Americans who are currently immigrating to the United States.

1. The federal government should make it less difficult for these immigrants to request and obtain asylum in the United States. Or

2. The federal government should make it more difficult for these immigrants to request and obtain asylum in the United States.

Figure 7 provides the overall distribution of the responses to this question among Texas registered voters, as well as provides the responses broken down by ethnic/racial group and partisan ID. Overall, a majority of 56% of these Texans believe the U.S. federal government should make it more difficult for Central American immigrants to request and obtain asylum in the United States while 44% believe the U.S. federal government should make it less difficult for them to request and obtain asylum.



Slightly more than three-fifths (63%) of white Texans believe the federal government should make it more difficult for these immigrants to request and obtain asylum, compared to 37% who believe the federal government should make it less difficult. A more narrow majority of Black Texans (55%) also favors making it more difficult, with 45% desiring that it be less difficult. Finally, in a near-mirror image of the Black Texans, 56% of Hispanic Texans believe the U.S. federal government should make it less difficult for Central Americans to request and obtain asylum, with 44% believing the government should make it more difficult.

Four-fifths (79%) of Republicans, three-fifths (57%) of Independents and one-third (35%) of Democrats believe the federal government should make it more difficult for Central Americans to request and obtain asylum. In contrast, two-thirds of Democrats (65%), two-fifths (43%) of Independents and one-fifth of Republicans (21%) believe the federal government should make it less difficult for Central Americans to request and obtain asylum.

Table 5 examines distribution of those who would make it more difficult or less difficult for Central Americans to request and obtain asylum in the United States among the Hispanic demographic sub-groups of gender, generation (chronological) educational achievement, and partisan identification.

Demo	Sub-Group	Federal Government Should Make it <u>Less Difficult</u> for CA Immigrants to Request & Obtain Asylum (%)	Federal Government Should Make it <u>More Difficult</u> for CA Immigrants to Request & Obtain Asylum (%)
Demo	Sub-Group		
Gender			
	Women	55	45
	Men	57	43
Generation			
	Boomer/Silent	35	65
	Gen X	50	50
	Millennial/Gen Z	70	30
Education			
	High School	48	52
	Some College-2Yr	61	39
	4Yr-Postgrad	61	39
Partisan ID			
	Democrat	67	33
	Independent	53	47
	Republican	35	65

Table 5. Opinion on Federal Government Asylum Policies for Current CentralAmerican Immigrants Among Texas Hispanic Demographic Sub-Groups

There do not exist any significant gender differences among Hispanics. In sharp contrast Hispanic Boomers/Silent Generation members (65%) are significantly more likely than Generation X Hispanics (50%) to want to make it more difficult to request and obtain asylum, and both generational cohorts are significantly more likely than Millennial and Generation Z Hispanics (30%) to want to make it more difficult for immigrants from Central America to request and obtain asylum.

Hispanics whose highest level of educational attainment is a high school degree or less (52%) are significantly more likely to want to make if more difficult for Central American immigrants to request and obtain asylum than are Hispanics with higher levels of educational attainment (39% and 39%).

Hispanic Republicans (65%) are significantly more likely than Hispanic Democrats (33%) to want to make if more difficult for Central American immigrants to request and obtain asylum, with Hispanic Independents (47%) in between, significantly less likely to want to make it more difficult than Republicans but significantly more likely to want to make it more difficult than Democrats.

Table 6 examines distribution of those who would make it more difficult or less difficult for Central Americans to request and obtain asylum in the United States among the Hispanic demographic sub-groups of religion, immigration generation, ancestry, household language use, and region of residence.

Table 6. Opinion	on Federa	l Government	Asylum	Policies	for	Current	Central
American Immigra	ints Among '	ſexas Hispanic	Demogra	phic Sub-	Grou	ıps	

Demo	Sub-Group	Federal Government Should Make it <u>Less Difficult</u> for CA Immigrants to Request & Obtain Asylum (%)	Federal Government Should Make it <u>More Difficult</u> for CA Immigrants to Request & Obtain Asylum (%)
Religion			
	Evangelical-Prot.	45	55
	Catholic	53	47
	Non-Religious	68	32
Generation			
	Immigrant	53	47
	1st Gen.	65	35
	2nd Gen.	53	47
	3rd Gen. +	53	47
Ancestry			
	1-2 Hisp. Grand.	55	45
	3-4 Hisp. Grand	56	44
Language			
	Spanish Dom.	57	43
	Equal En. & Sp.	52	48
	English Dom.	57	43
Region			
9	DFW Metro	60	40
	HOU Metro	55	45
	SA Metro	56	44
	South Texas	49	51


Hispanics who are Evangelical Protestants (55%) are significantly more likely to want to make it more difficult for Central American immigrants to request and obtain asylum than are non-religious Hispanics (32%). The only noteworthy immigration generation related difference is that first generation Hispanics (i.e., the children of immigrants) are significantly more likely to want to make if less difficult (65%) for Central American immigrants to request and obtain asylum than Hispanics from any other immigration generation, including immigrants (i.e., those

born abroad). Ancestry, household language and region of residence are not related in any notable way to a respondent's position on this issue.

4. Approval/Disapproval of Abbott & Biden U.S.-Mexico Border Policy


In two separate questions the survey respondents were also asked if they approve or disapprove of the way the President Joe Biden and Texas Governor Greg Abbott are handling the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border. The response options were strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, strongly disapprove and don't know.

Figure 8 displays the proportion of Texas registered voters who approve of and disapprove of Governor Abbott and President Biden's respective handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border.



Nearly one-half (49%) of Texas registered voters approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border (26% strongly and 23% somewhat) compared to 31% who approve of Biden's handling of the situation at the border (10% strongly and 21% somewhat). Two-fifths (42%) of Texas registered voters disapprove of Abbott's handling of the border situation (31% strongly and 11% somewhat) compared to three-fifths (61%) who disapprove of Biden's handling of the border situation (46% strongly and 15% somewhat).

Figure 9 provides public approval of Abbott and Biden's respective handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border broken down by ethnicity/race with the strongly approve and somewhat disapprove and strongly disapprove and somewhat disapprove responses consolidated into one approve and one disapprove category and the don't know responses excluded from the calculation.




Three-fifths of white Texans (63%) approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border compared to only one-fifth (23%) who approve of Biden's handling of the situation at the border. The respective disapproval proportions among white Texans for Abbott and Biden respectively are 37% and 77%.

Slightly more than one-half of Hispanic Texans (54%) disapprove of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border compared to 61% who disapprove of Biden's handling of the situation. Conversely, 46% of Hispanic Texans approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border, while 39% approve of Biden's.

Two-thirds of Black Texans disapprove (71%) of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border and approve (68%) of Biden's handling of the situation at the border.

Figure 10 provides public approval of Abbott and Biden's respective handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border broken down by partisan ID with the strongly approve and somewhat disapprove and strongly disapprove and somewhat disapprove responses consolidated into one approve and one disapprove category and the don't know responses excluded from the calculation.



An overwhelming majority of Texas Republicans (89%) approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border while an overwhelming majority (91%) disapprove of Biden's. Conversely, an overwhelming majority (albeit slightly less overwhelming) of Democrats approve of Biden's handling of the situation at the border (72%) and disapprove of Abbott's (79%). Independents are relatively evenly split in regard to Abbott's handling of the border situation, with 56% approving and 44% disapproving, but overwhelmingly disapprove of Biden's handling of the situation, with a disapproval proportion of 83% and an approval proportion of 17%.

Table 7 examines the levels of approval and disapproval of the respective handling of the situation of the border situation by Abbott and Biden respectively among the Hispanic demographic sub-groups of gender, generation (chronological) educational achievement, and partisan identification.

Demo	Sub-Group	Approval / Disapproval of Abbott's Handling of the U.SMexico Border Situation	Approval / Disapproval of Biden's Handling of the U.SMexico Border Situation
Demo	Sub-Group		
Gender			
	Women	39/61	41/59
	Men	55/45	37/63
Generation			
	Boomer/Silent	49/51	34/66
	Gen X	48/52	43/57
	Millennial/Gen Z	44/56	38/62
Education			
	High School	54/46	37/63
	Some College-2Yr	41/59	44/56
	4Yr-Postgrad	40/60	39/61
Partisan ID			
	Democrat	23/77	68/32
	Independent	52/48	23/77
	Republican	81/19	13/87

 Table 7. Approval and Disapproval of Abbott & Biden Handling of Border Situation

 Among Texas Hispanic Demographic Sub-Groups (% Approve/%Disapprove)

Hispanic men are significantly more likely to approve and significantly less likely to disapprove of Abbott's handling of the border situation than are Hispanic women, in contrast to the case for Biden where there do no exist any salient gender differences in regard to approval/disapproval. While there do not exist any noteworthy generational differences in regard to approval/disapproval of Abbott and Biden's handling of the border situation, Hispanics whose highest degree of educational attainment is a high school degree or less are significantly more likely to approve and significantly less likely to disapprove of Abbott's handling of the border situation than are Hispanics with higher levels of educational attainment. A similar educational difference is not found vis-à-vis Biden.

Hispanic Republicans are significantly more likely to approve of Abbott's handling of the border situation than are Hispanic Democrats (and vice versa regarding disapproval), with Hispanic Independents equidistant, significantly more likely to approve than Democrats and significantly less likely to approve than Republicans. Hispanic Democrats are significantly more likely to approve of Biden's handling of the situation at the border than are Hispanic Independents and Republicans (and vice versa), with Hispanic Independents notably closer to their Republican counterparts in regard to their opinion of Biden's performance at the border. Table 8 examines the levels of approval and disapproval of the respective handling of the situation of the border situation by Abbott and Biden respectively among the Hispanic demographic sub-groups of religion, immigration generation, ancestry, household language use, and region of residence.

Demo	Sub-Group	Approval / Disapproval of Abbott's Handling of the U.SMexico Border Situation	Approval / Disapproval of Biden's Handling of the U.SMexico Border Situation
Religion			
	Evangelical-Prot.	57/43	25/75
	Catholic	46/54	47/53
	Non-Religious	39/61	36/64
Generation			
	Immigrant	61/39	53/47
	1st Gen.	43/57	44/56
	2nd Gen.	38/62	38/62
	3rd Gen. +	50/50	35/65
Ancestry			
	1-2 Hisp. Grand.	49/51	25/75
	3-4 Hisp. Grand	45/55	44/56
Language			
	Spanish Dom.	60/40	44/56
	Equal En. & Sp.	44/56	56/44
	English Dom.	45/55	30/69
Region			
-	DFW Metro	48/52	42/58
	HOU Metro	52/48	45/55
	SA Metro	35/65	33/67
	South Texas	50/50	44/56

Table 8. Approval and Disapproval of Abbott & Biden Handling of Border Situation Among Texas Hispanic Demographic Sub-Groups (% Approve/%Disapprove)

Evangelical Protestant Hispanics (57%) are significantly more likely to approve of Abbott's handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border than either Catholic (46%) or non-religious Hispanics (39%), and are significantly more likely to disapprove of Biden's handling (75%) of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border than either Catholic (53%) or non-religious Hispanics (64%).

Hispanic immigrants (61%) are significantly more likely than either first (43%) or second (38%) generation Hispanics to approve of Abbott's handling of the border situation. They also however are significantly more likely than second or third (and

beyond) generation Hispanics to approve of Biden's handling of the situation at the U.S.-Mexico border (53% to 38% and 35% respectively).

While Hispanics with only two Hispanic grandparents do not differ from Hispanics with three or four Hispanic grandparents in regard to their approval of Abbott's handling of the situation at the border, Hispanics with two or fewer Hispanic grandparents are notably more likely to disapprove and notably less likely to approve of Biden's handling of the U.S.-Mexico border situation than are Hispanics with three or four Hispanic grandparents (75% vs. 56% and 25% vs. 44% respectively).

Hispanics living in households where Spanish is the dominant language (60%) are significantly more likely to approve of Abbott's handling of the border situation than are Hispanics living in households where English and Spanish are used equally (44%) or where English is the lingua franca (45%).

The only noteworthy regional difference related to Abbott and Biden's handling of the border situation is that metro San Antonio Hispanics are notably less likely to approve than Hispanics living in other regions of the state.

5. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

The Texas Hispanic Policy Foundation conducted an online survey sample of 1,402 Texas registered voters between October 14 and 27, 2021, utilizing YouGov data collection systems and processes. Sample instruments, oversight research and survey analysis was conducted by the Texas Hispanic Policy Foundation in coordination with faculty from Rice University. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, and education. In addition to the standard sample of 1,000, an oversample of a total of 402 Hispanic respondents was included. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2019 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, and region. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and poststratified according to these deciles. The weights were then post-stratified on 2016 and 2020 Presidential vote choice, and a four-way stratification of gender, age (4categories), race (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight.